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MURDER ON ISLE AU HAUT:
VIOLENCE AND JEFFERSON’S
EMBARGO IN COASTAL MAINE,
1807-1809
By J o s h u a M . S m i t h
Maine's early nineteenth-century smugglers also capture the atten
tion of Joshua Smith. In his study o f the events surrounding the Isle
an Hunt murder o f a customhouse officer with the improbable name
of Lazaro Bogdomovitch, Smith finds, like Alan Taylor, that Maine
communities both overtly and covertly resisted the imposition o f laws
inimical to their economic well-being. Joshua Smith is a Ph.D. candi
date at the University o f Maine, where he is completing a dissertation
entitled uThe Rogues o f yQnoddy: Smuggling in the Maine-New
Brunswick Borderlands, 1783-1820

on a remote Maine island one dark and stormy night
would seem to be the stuff of novels, but the real life events
surrounding the murder of a federal customhouse officer on
Isle au Haut ultimately proved far stranger than any tale concocted by a
mystery writer. In November 1808, smugglers murdered a customs
guard named Lazaro Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut and cast his body
adrift. Officials captured and jailed the perpetrators after a harrowing
sea chase, but a mob of men disguised as women attacked the jail and re
leased most of the prisoners. At the ensuing trial the court was forced to
let the remaining prisoners go free because no witnesses would come
forward. The federal court system finally apprehended two suspects and
tried them, but one escaped and lived in exile for the rest of his life, and
the other languished in prison until a drunken sailor murdered him in
1815.
This series of events, with all its twists and turns, raises many ques
tions. Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch, and why did smugglers murder
him? Why did witnesses refuse to come forward to identify his murder
ers? What does this murder and the events surrounding it tell us about
Penobscot Bay or about smuggling in the early nineteenth century? The
answers have been difficult to find. Bogdomovitch was a foreigner with
out family, whose corpse was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere
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in Castine.1 The unwillingness of witnesses to come forward, too, re
mains a mystery. Local histories do not mention the incident, and, to this
day, some people on Isle au Haut insist that no murder has ever occurred
there.2 Yet court records, government reports, newspaper accounts, and
the letter of a son whose father died in the incident verify that smugglers
murdered a man named Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut in the fall of
1808.3 The historical amnesia about Bagdomovitch's murder suggests
that the incident was not merely forgotten but actively and purposefully
obscured, omitted from the public memory because it reflected badly on
the community as a whole. What then was the significance of these
events to Penobscot Bay communities? Bagdomovitch's murder reveals
that political and economic tensions tore coastal Maine communities
apart in the early nineteenth century. The key issue in this conflict was
the role of government in regulating seaborne commerce. Ultimately
Bogdomovitch s murder resulted from hostilities emerging from a single
question: Did the coastal populace have a right to trade overseas and to
fish coastal waters without governmental interference?
Conflict over government regulation of maritime trade in Maine's
coastal communities parallels the often violent disputes erupting be
tween absentee landowners and agrarian squatters in Maine's inland
communities. The similarities are in fact quite stunning. Less than a year
after the Isle au Haut murder an armed group of squatters in Malta
(modern Windsor) attacked and killed a land surveyor named Paul
Chadwick. A failed jailbreak followed, and the jury refused to convict the
accused murderers. In both instances, public sentiment supported the
accused, resulting in their release. The squatters murdered Chadwick be
cause they believed that they possessed rights to farmland superseding
the rights of landed proprietors and state law. Similarly, on Isle au Haut
smugglers believed they had a right to pursue maritime trade despite
federal laws to the contrary. Questions about the pursuit of economic
happiness, it would seem, divided Maine communities to the point
where murder became an option partially sanctioned by the community.
While the Isle au Haut murder has remained obscure, the Malta inci
dent recently received attention in Alan Taylor's study of agrarian resist
ance in Maine, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors. Taylor found that
Maine's squatters presumed that they had a right to low-priced land in
the aftermath of the American Revolution and bitterly resented the land
speculation of men such as Henry Knox. The squatter resistance was ini
tially a community-based effort framed in terms of morality, but, even
tually, it found a stronger voice in the form of party politics. The Penob
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scot Bay smugglers used methods very similar to those of agrarian squat
ters to defend their right to engage in maritime pursuits.1
While Maine’s squatters resisted the pressure of landed proprietors to
eject them from their hardscrabble farms, coastal smugglers objected to
the control of federal customs officers. The proprietors’ skillful manipu
lation of the legal system to force squatters off disputed lands produced a
simmering conflict. Squatters disguised as “White Indians” harassed
deputy sheriffs and surveyors, usually through intimidation rather than
actual use of force. Smugglers, too, organized a collective resistance that
emphasized stealth and intimidation over actual violence. Unlike the
agrarian protests, however, smugglers first attempted to use political
means to resolve the conflict. When those efforts failed, coastal residents
resorted to similar methods of popular violence used by squatters.
Resistance to federal trade regulations differs from agrarian resistance
in another important aspect: the precipitate speed with which New Eng
land’s maritime communities turned against the federal government.
While the squatter resistance predated the American Revolution, mar
itime communities generally ranked among the staunchest supporters of
the federal government after 1789. Port communities benefited from

Woodcut of smugglers from a children’s book entitled The Book of Commerce
by Sea or Land (Philadelphia: Uriah Hunt, 1837).
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federal trade policies that provided generous tariff breaks to American
merchants, gave cod bounties for fishermen, protected American ship
ping with a navy, and built lighthouses at the mouths of harbors. The
complacency with which Maine port communities regarded the federal
government quickly gave way to horror, however, when President
Thomas Jefferson attempted to halt overseas trade completely in an ef
fort to punish European powers for their transgressions against Ameri
can shipping and mariners in his infamous embargo of 1807-1809.
Historians have not done a very good job of unpacking the embargo’s
meaning for nineteenth-century Americans. Local historians often dwell
on the collapse of great fortunes and resultant suicides of previously
prosperous merchants. Political historians have concentrated on the po
litical consequences of the embargo, debating its effectiveness and im
portance at the national level. Maritime historians inevitably lament the
embargo as a tragedy while biographers of Thomas Jefferson have both
lauded and vilified him for his policies. But there exists no full-length
analysis of the embargo’s political, economic, and social effects. This is
unfortunate, for the embargo can tell us a great deal about ordinary peo
ple’s vision of the new republic’s economic future.5
Maine’s Penobscot Bay region offers an ideal laboratory in which to
analyze the embargo’s effects. According to more than one observer, no
section of the nation was harder hit by the embargo than Maine.
Although communities all along the eastern seaboard faced economic
crisis, Maine’s reliance on the production and export of staples such as
timber or fish made it somewhat of an oddity in the United States."
Maine struggled more than other maritime regions under the embargo
restrictions because it could not produce its own food, especially flour.
Halting international commerce, the coasting trade, and fishing, the em
bargo devastated all social classes, not least of all because food (and
credit to buy provisions) became scarce. In Hancock County there were
complaints of starvation and threats of violence by woodsmen who
could not procure credit to buy flour for their hungry families. Coastal
Maine’s almost exclusive reliance on seaborne commerce explains both
the resistance to trade restrictions and, perhaps, the period’s inland un
rest. The squatters who so fiercely resisted landed proprietors and their
surveyors in the woods may have been driven to desperation by the eco
nomic impact of Jefferson’s embargo. Not only were timber prices deci
mated, but coastal merchants could not afford to offer inland customers
credit to buy provisions.7
Episodes of resistance to the embargo are one measure of the policy’s
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impact. The federal customs collectors stationed in various ports bore
the brunt of enforcing the embargo laws. In the Penobscot district active
resistance culminated in the murder of customs guard Lazaro Bogdomovitch. Through it all the local customs collector, Josiah Hook of Castine, stood firm in his enforcement of the unpopular laws. His particu
larly intransigent approach brought about a correspondingly violent
reaction from Penobscot Bay communities and resulted in crowd actions
against him and his followers."
The overall impression of this collective violence and intimidation is
not one of a mob out of control but quite the reverse. Restraint seems to
have ruled most popular reactions to the embargo. Resisters preferred
threats and intimidation over actual violence. Crowd actions were not
aimed at removing the customs collectors but, rather, at bringing them
within a societal norm. When the community gathered to express its
outrage over the embargo, it singled out the collectors and their assis
tants as violators of a perceived right to engage in marine commerce and
fishing. By coming together, the crowd developed a tighter bond of soli
darity, reaffirmed their commercial rights, and singled out the collectors
as “deviants.” In so doing, they firmly established a boundary between
right and wrong, deviant and conformist. These boundaries were moral
in nature; the collective established a favorable identity for itself and an
unfavorable one for the offender."
Coastal communities began to deem customs officers as deviants
when, in pursuit of smugglers, the federal officials turned to question
able shows of armed force. This occurred as early as June 1808. An in
formant in Buckstown (modern Bucksport) on the Penobscot River told
the local customs collector that four hogsheads of rum had been smug
gled and concealed in town. Hook soon arrived “full of consequence and
bustle, breathing threats, penalties, and confiscations.” While searching
the waterfront for rum, the collector saw three men in a wherry-boat
rowing across the river with a barrel clearly visible between them. Sus
pecting evasion of the embargo laws, the collector ordered the boat to re
turn. The men ignored the order and continued to row for the opposite
shore. The enraged collector had an assistant fetch him a loaded musket
and threatened to fire on the boat. The men did not respond but, in
stead, threw the supposed contraband into the water. The barrel, as it
turns out, was completely empty and floated high in the water. An em
barrassed Collector Hook soon departed Buckstown in high dudgeon.
The local newspaper mocked the collector asking, “Shall the free citizens
of this country have their lives endangered by every petty officer of the
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customs, and be at the hazard of having their brains blown out every
time they cross the river with a hogshead or barrel?” It was a gentle chid
ing, a part of the collector's continuing education in standards of behav
ior acceptable to the community. Later lessons were not to be so mild.10
Buckstown and other ports reacted collectively to the embargo. The
community, almost as a whole, undermined Hook's efforts to prosecute
embargo violators. Witnesses refused to appear at court, and juries re
fused to give guilty verdicts in smuggling cases. Buckstown's merchants,
who had supported the uniform admiralty law offered by the federal
government before the embargo, quickly reverted to a popular sense of
law when free trade was threatened.” This communal resistance frus
trated the collector immensely. It also frustrated President Jefferson, who
initiated a series of punitive measures against the town. Jefferson did not
aim these restrictions at individual Buckstown citizens but at the com
munity as a whole because of the town's “general spirit of disobedience.”
If Buckstown and other towns were going to resist the embargo as a
united society, then the executive branch would reciprocate, and punish
them accordingly.12 The local press saw Jefferson's reaction to resistance
in Buckstown as a form of oppression equivalent with the infamous
Boston Port Act of 1774, reminding readers that they were heirs to a tra
dition of Revolutionary resistance.13
The commercial orientation of Maine's coastal communities enabled
them to present a largely united front against the embargo. Sociological
studies of New England merchants suggest that they possessed commu
nal values emphasizing consensus and friendship and that merchants os
tracized individuals who deviated from that unity. This strong sense of
community, combined with appeals to higher authority for relief, peace
ful resistance of authority, and ritualized collective violence, suggests
that the coastal populace may have been practicing a form of “moral
economy.”14
No discussion of moral economy is complete without a consideration
of E. P. Thompson's work on that subject. Thompson found that work
ing people in eighteenth-century England had devised a means of resist
ing the market economy when it threatened their access to food.
Thompson defined this process as “a consistent traditional view of social
norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several par
ties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to consti
tute the moral economy of the poor.” He very carefully, however, states
that this does not mean that working people had an inherent moral su
periority. He uses the term moral to indicate that they possessed a set of
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expectations based on patriarchal obligations. Nor does he attack the
market economy as immoral but, rather, points out that rioters were
themselves deeply involved in the market economy. Other British schol
ars have since refined the concept, indicating that, when times were
tough, communities reacted with an ethos of self-help that drew loosely
on memories of traditional forms of resistance.15
American historians have developed their own theories of moral
economy, always with reference to Thompson’s 1971 groundbreaking ar
ticle on the subject. The most famous example is Gary Nash’s considera
tion of Boston food markets in The Urban Crucible. Barbara Clark Smith
picked up on the theme of the moral economy of provision in her study
of food rioters and found that American communities during and long
after the Revolutionary period possessed “standards of obligation among
neighbors” that linked moral and economic matters.10American histori
ans also moved beyond the bread nexus, however. Ruth Bogin’s “Peti
tioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America”
argues that many petitioners of the period were “working to transform
the traditional ‘moral economy’ into a defense of personal independence
and moderate opportunity against perpetual exploitation and the threat
of impoverishment by those who held the political reins.” Bogin found
that, in times of crisis, middling level individuals joined the poor in en
forcing a moral economy, which expanded into a republican view of
equality. According to Bogin, the food nexus in America was less impor
tant than the “land nexus”: debt and taxes also created popular reactions.
Many petitions expressed the grievances of poor Americans after the
Revolution with “plain words and a direct assertiveness.” The signifi
cance of these petitions was that they actively sought government inter
vention in the economy to create a “more just society” but this did not
mean that petitioners rejected capitalism. Bogin’s definition fits neatly
with what inland Maine settlers sought from the landed proprietors.17
Moral economy has taken on many different meanings in different
contexts, but historians agree on a set of distinctive characteristics. First,
a common denominator of moral economy is a community’s perception
that an abuse of moral conventions regarding economics had occurred.
Often this meant the price of bread, but it might be conflict over land
ownership, or other events that threatened the good not only of individ
uals but the community or region as a whole. Second, collective violence,
or its threat, were structured events in which participants only reluc
tantly resorted to bloodshed. Petitions or warnings usually preceded di
rect actions, which often possessed their own ritualized proceedings.
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Whether legal or extralegal, community members thought that their ac
tions represented a prior obligation to aid weaker members of the com
munity. Third, the people involved in extralegal activities expected sym
pathy from the community and officialdom. Magistrates, soldiers, and
others often chose to ignore, acquiesce to, or even participate in petitions
and crowd actions. Finally, these attempts at economic correction were
made at a local or regional level and might be to the detriment of the
government's political economy, or to the nation as a whole.18
Applying the concepts of moral economy to coastal Maine provides a
model that allows a greater understanding of resistance to Jefferson's
embargo. Maine's ports and harbors were dedicated to a market econ
omy, but this does not exclude the possibility that they acted under the
terms of a moral economy as well. E. P. Thompson himself conceded the
idea that fishing communities could adhere to a moral economy. Other
scholars have gone a step further by suggesting that pirates took part in a
marine moral economy and that sailors espoused a form of egalitarian
ism when they leaped into shoreside tumults.14
The waterfront had always been a rough area of America ports and
also a place where sailors and other workers intruded into the political
world. One need only think of the many affrays on Boston's waterfront
before the American Revolution. Yet, the political thinkers of the day
were hesitant to recognize the value of mariners and others to the young
republic. Thomas Jefferson stands out as a politician who failed to un
derstand the nature of maritime communities. Jefferson believed in a re
public based upon independent “yeoman farmers.'' Merchants, sailors,
shipbuilders, and fishermen were inherently inferior because they did
not possess the self-reliance that Jefferson believed farmers possessed.
The marine community, however, was not to be dismissed lightly, and it
tormented Jefferson throughout his final year in office.20
Mariners dominated Maine's crowd actions during the embargo and
the crowning achievement of these riots was to sail away with a cargo.
While many fled to the Maritime Provinces, however, others were left
unemployed and penniless in port: a combination that was extremely
conducive to mischief. Lumbermen enjoyed a reputation scarcely less
boisterous than that of seamen, and, with markets denied the fruit of
their labor, they too were idled. Fishermen also found themselves unem
ployed as the successive embargo laws made it virtually impossible for a
fishing vessel to put to sea. These workers stood near the bottom of New
England society, and they were the ones who formed the core of resist
ance to the embargo. But, as the effects of the embargo impoverished ar
tisans and merchants, they joined sailors and fishermen, reinforcing the
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unity of the community in antipathy against the commercial restric
tions. The lower orders welcomed the leadership of merchants and sea
captains because it legitimized their grievances.21
Coastal New England did not subscribe to the notion that “commerce
corrupts ” Nor did Massachusetts Federalists entirely embrace the eco
nomic liberalism of Adam Smith. Ideas of deference remained strong in
coastal Massachusetts until after the War of 1812, and those ideas were
often regarded as reciprocal in nature. Paternalism remained a force that
united society against external threats. New England society thus re
mained bound by traditional obligations within a community, even as it
increasingly moved towards a market economy. While members of the
community were encouraged to prosper, doing so at the expense of oth
ers was frowned upon, and persons who profited unjustly at the expense
of the community could be the targets of the crowd's wrath. Custom
house officers were often perceived as just such individuals because they
received a fifty percent share of the proceeds of any contraband auc
tioned by the government. Federal laws also allowed informers lucrative
incentives and, as a result, mobs often targeted informers. A crowd
tarred and feathered one unfortunate informer in Portland in October
1808.22
Maine communities protested the morality of the embargo on two
principles. First, coastal residents believed they possessed a right to wrest
a living from the sea. In petition after petition to President Jefferson,
Maine towns pointed to their reliance on the sea for their livelihoods and
the impossibility of pursuing agriculture. Opponents of the embargo in
terpreted the complete and seemingly perpetual denial of the right to
navigate as an infringement of their constitutional right to enjoy the use
of their property. There was also some feeling that the federal govern
ment had stepped beyond its powers to regulate interstate trade by deny
ing vessels the right to proceed from one port to another within the same
state. When these communities found themselves very suddenly impov
erished in the midst of a spectacular shipping boom, they soon began to
draw moral conclusions about the originators of the laws that denied
them their economic rights. The Republicans of Massachusetts and
Maine suffered a huge setback in the polls in the aftermath of the em
bargo and again when the federal government curtailed trade during the
War of 1812.23
The second moral issue raised by those opposed to the embargo was
the enforcement of the various embargo acts. By the end of the embargo,
customs officials were empowered to search stores and warehouses with
out a warrant, a privilege they had previously enjoyed only on ship

26

Maine History

board. Collectors were also empowered to call out state militia without
the governor’s approval and to call on the navy and army as well. Oppo
nents objected to the enforcement of laws at bayonet point, and odious
comparisons were made to the British occupation of Boston in the
1770s.24
The most obvious manifestation of the embargo’s oppression was the
arming of customs officials. Before the embargo, customs officials were
unarmed, as were revenue cutters. By the summer of 1808, however, cus
toms officials had heavily armed themselves. In the Penobscot district
Collector Hook mounted swivel guns on a sloop and supplied his men
with muskets. Customhouse officers, on at least one occasion, irked
Buckstown residents by firing a salute after a successful raid on a ware
house full of contraband rum. Not only were muskets and swivel guns
fired, but the federal officers gave a hearty cheer for “Jefferson, rum, and
embargo!” The presence of so much weaponry in the hands of those op
posed to the community caused alarm all along the coast.25
Resistance was at first legal and peaceful in nature. Town meetings
protested the embargo in petitions to President Jefferson. When this tac
tic failed, towns turned to the Massachusetts General Court, describing
their fears in vivid language. The petitions of the port towns surround
ing Penobscot Bay were especially strident in tone. Camden warned that
that the embargo “cannot be carried into effect in this part of the coun
try, except by military force, and we dread the consequences that may en
sue from fire arms being put into the hands of unprincipled men, acting
under the authority of the officers of government against the united and
deliberate sentiments of the most respectable part of our citizens.”
Belfast resolved that every person who aided in the enforcement of the
embargo was an enemy to liberty and the Constitution. Buckstown de
clared that President Jefferson possessed a “contemptible and wicked”
policy toward the commercial states and further condemned customs of
ficers as “enemies to their country.”2'"
Another method of resisting the embargo among Penobscot Bay
towns was a poison pen campaign against Collector Hook. In June 1808,
Hook received an official reprimand for his lack of vigilance in suppress
ing smuggling. Collector Hook was astonished; he claimed that no col
lector had been more vigilant in enforcing the embargo than himself and
that he had risked his life in enforcing the laws. Collector Hook was
right. While other customs collectors resigned their offices rather than
enforce the unpopular law, turned a blind eye to violations, or even
openly colluded with smugglers, Hook remained firm. On at least one
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occasion Hook even sent an armed boat to help customs officials on
Mount Desert Island, well outside of his own district. The complaints re
ceived by the Treasury Department about Hook's lack of vigilance
should be taken with a grain of salt: no doubt they were written by indi
viduals who wanted Hook removed for exactly the opposite reason.27
Resistance soon turned to direct action. While some feared taking this
course, the more desperate or bold mounted a campaign that soon
showed how ineffective the embargo was. As early as April, two vessels
loaded with fish allegedly parted their lines in a gale and sailed illegally
from Buckstown. In June, the United States Navy was informed that
smugglers were lightering illicit cargoes off Deer Isle and dispatched USS
Wasp to investigate. In late August, a sloop loaded with flour owned by a
Republican slipped out of Belfast. Clearly the community consensus had
grown to the point that it absorbed those who politically should have
supported the President's policy. Despite increasingly strict laws, vessels
continued to escape from the Penobscot district in the fall and winter.
Two schooners in September, two vessels in November, and at least ten in
January evaded the local revenue cutter and customhouse agents. Nor
were these events solitary, desperate measures: they might involve as
many as sixty men. On at least two occasions, customs officers were as
saulted while attempting to prevent vessels from sailing contrary to the
law.28
These crowd actions followed a pattern. They were not random acts
of violence but the attainment of select extralegal goals by the crowd.
Charles Tilly, in From Mobilization to Revolution recognized five stages
that lead to collective violence: interests, organization, mobilization, op
portunity, and collective action. The disturbances of the Penobscot dis
trict follow this pattern. Communities in the area clearly stated their re
liance on a maritime economy in letters to the President. The port towns
rallied around a unifying structure, the morality of their cause, and the
apparent immorality of those deviating from it, resulting in greater or
ganization. Once aware of their interests and organization, the commu
nities mobilized into preparations for direct action. When an opportu
nity presented itself, be it a covering storm, or absence of custom
officials, the crowd moved to collective action. The process was not nec
essarily quick— it was ten months before violence became a serious
problem in the Penobscot district— but, as it progressed, the process
strengthened, gaining support from more of the community as the ef
fects of the embargo became unendurable.29
The escalation of violence and desperation of the coastal communi-
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ties called for more radical actions on the part of those who violated the
embargo laws. The pinnacle of resistance to the embargo occurred late in
1808 and early in 1809. In November 1808, Buckstown merchants deter
mined to repossess a cargo of flour and rice impounded on Isle au Haut,
a remote island fishing community on the fringe of Penobscot Bay They
used the schooner Peggy, a vessel from Liverpool, Nova Scotia but with
Eastport, Maine, painted on her stern as a ruse. Both local and foreign
sailors manned the Peggy, with the intention of rescuing the contraband.
The crew armed themselves with muskets, cutlasses, blunderbusses, and
boarding pikes. On Sunday, November 6, a “dark and stormy night,” at
about seven o'clock the Peggy arrived in Kimball’s Harbor on Isle au
Haut (present-day Isle au Haut Thoroughfare) and came to anchor. A
boat loaded with ten armed men put off from the schooner and ap
proached the dock on which five customs officers guarded the contra
band load of foodstuffs. A customhouse officer named Wilson hailed the
boat; when the smugglers replied that they were from nearby Vinalhaven, he ordered them to row ashore. Immediately the boat approached
the officer on the beach, and men sprang from it. With guns cocked, the
smugglers took Wilson prisoner and put him in the bow of the boat.
The following sequence of events is not clear, but it seems that the
smugglers rushed the remaining officers on the dock. Shots were fired on
both sides; many believed that the customhouse officers fired first. The
customs officers fired “cut shot,” ordinary musket balls scored to break
apart for a nonlethal, shotgun-like effect, while the smugglers fired regu
lar musket balls. The cut shot wounded a smuggler, and the smugglers’
musket balls killed the customhouse officer, Lazaro Bogdomovitch.
Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch? The sources are less than satisfac
tory, but it is known that he was a foreigner. The local Federalist newspa
per described him as a renegade arsonist and deserter from Napoleons
armies. Hook described him as Italian, others as Portuguese. The news
paper accounts further stated that Bogdomovitch had no relatives in the
area. Probably he was a drifter attracted by the promise of working for
Hook at the generous rate of two dollars per day As a foreigner, he
would not have hesitated to enforce the embargo. Furthermore, Bogdo
movitch apparently had few qualms about using violence; he was over
heard making threats to kill those who wanted to rescue the contraband
flour in the days before his murder. Finally, painted in the press as a for
eigner, a criminal, a deserter from the army of the hated Napoleon, and
prone to violence, Bogdomovitch could not have been a less sympathetic
victim.'11
The smugglers’ treatment of Bogdomovitch contrasted strongly with
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their actions toward the other customs guards on Isle au Haut. After the
skirmish they dragged Bagdomovitch's corpse into the water and set it
adrift, perhaps as a further insult to the man, or as an attempt to hide the
body, or both. They took another customs officer prisoner but released
him after taking his weapon and the remaining two guards fled into the
darkness. Meanwhile, the crew of the Peggy collected and secured all the
small craft on the island so that no one could slip away for help, and Wil
son remained a prisoner on board the Peggy. All in all, minimal force had
been used, with the curious exception of Bogdomovitch.31
Unfortunately for the smugglers, the two escaped guards found a
boat on the other side of the island. They went to Castine and informed
Collector Hook of the skirmish. He immediately called for a posse. Thir
teen men joined the collector on the schooner he used as a revenue cut
ter and four men followed in a small sail boat. Despite a “violent gale of
wind,” the two vessels immediately sailed for Isle au Haut. The small sail
boat never made it. The boat, and the four men aboard it, simply van
ished, presumably lost at sea.32 The collector's schooner arrived safely at
Isle au Haut, but too late; the Peggy had already loaded the provisions
and left. The collector pursued and found the Peggy at anchor in Fox Is
land Thoroughfare. Spying the cutter, the smugglers slipped the
schooner's cable and crowded on sail in an attempt to escape. As the rev
enue cutter gained on the Peggy the smugglers hoisted a British flag to
deter their pursuers but to no avail. The cutter overtook them, and the
Peggy surrendered without further resistance.
Collector Hook took his prisoners to the Hancock County jail in Cas
tine. Because the federal government had no homicide statute, the pris
oners were interned at the county's expense on a charge of murder. The
incident excited enough controversy that Hancock County officials
posted two additional guards at the jail. Collector Hook then departed to
attend federal court in Portland. During his absence, more shipping fled
the Penobscot, and more gunfire was exchanged. On November 15, the
collector's assistant, alarmed by the violence, wrote an urgent plea for
help to the commanders of any naval vessel that happened to be near.
The urgency of the letter is clear. Addressing “the commanders of the
U.S. ship Chesapeake, ship Wasp, or brig Argus” the collector wrote: “I
have to request that you will have the goodness to send some force to this
district immediately, if it is in your power— every means is now used in
this district to violate the Embargo laws by the opposers of government.
The lives of those employed by the Collector are now in imminent dan
ger” In response, the Navy dispatched USS Argus to Penobscot Bay.33
Meanwhile the eight prisoners on murder charges languished in jail.
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Some were sick, and one was wounded by cut shot. Their stay however
was interrupted on Tuesday, December 13. At two o’clock in the morn
ing, a heavily armed mob disguised as women descended upon the jail.
They entered the jailhouse and demanded the keys from the assistant
jailer who had little choice in the matter. The mob then unlocked the cell
doors. Four of the prisoners escaped, but two guards arrived in time to
prevent the remaining four from leaving. The escapees were never seen
again, and the remaining prisoners were fitted with shackles to await
trial in June.'*
In the aftermath of the jail break Collector Hook suffered severe
blows to his authority. The master of the local revenue cutter became so
alarmed at the proliferation of violence that he disarmed his vessel. Col
lector Hook’s response is unrecorded, but it happened just after he sent
his brother to Boston to buy more weapons. One newspaper raged that
the collector’s brother was “purchasing arms to butcher these unhappy
sufferers if they do not tamely submit to this infernal usurpation [the
embargo).” No doubt the collector was as determined as ever, and the
captain’s actions must have displeased him. The response of the commu
nity, however, was entirely different. In a town meeting Castine thanked
the captain for his “manly and patriotic conduct in withdrawing his guns
from the cutter.” When the court tried the remaining four prisoners in

Hancock County Sheriff George Ulmer’s House in Lincolnville.
Photograph circa 1900. Courtesy Lincolnville Historical Society.
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John McMasters paid dearly for his role in the Peggy incident. He spent his
remaining years in Wiscasset’s Lincoln County jail because of his inability
to pay the fine resulting from his smuggling conviction. Lincoln County jail and
prisonkeeper’s house, Wiscasset. Photograph circa 1900.

Courtesy Lincoln County Historical Association.

June, no witnesses came forward, and the smugglers were released on a
plea of “ignoramus.”35
Federal court had more success. The court impounded the Peggy and,
in March, auctioned the schooner and its cargo of flour and rice. The
proceeds of the auction were split between the federal government and
Collector Hook.36 The federal courts also successfully prosecuted the or
ganizers of the Peggy incident. Andrew Webster, a Castine physician and
deputy sheriff, went to trial in March 1809, was found guilty and fined
$2500. Unable to pay the fine, the federal court placed Webster in the
Castine jail as a debtor but not for long. Four days after internment,
Webster “broke goal.” As a former deputy sheriff, Webster must have
been quite familiar with the building; he broke a hole in the plaster ceil
ing of the second floor debtor’s chamber, crawled into the garret, and,
using a bed cord, reached the ground through a scuttle in the jail’s root.
Webster escaped to Nova Scotia, where he married and lived for the rest
of his life.37
The federal courts had more luck in prosecuting the principal organ
izer of the Peggy incident, John McMasters, a merchant heavily involved
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in smuggling. McMasters was a slippery character. In various documents
he claimed to have resided in Castine, Bucksport, and Eastport in Maine;
Boston, Massachusetts; and Halifax, Nova Scotia. Even before the Peggy
incident, federal officials discovered that McMasters was involved in
smuggling at Eastport. McMasters went to trial in September 1809, when
a jury found him guilty of breaking the embargo laws and fined him
$10,000. Unable to pay this staggering fine, McMasters went to the Lin
coln County jail in Wiscasset for debt. There he stayed for years, unable
to pay, and petitioning Congress several times for release. Congress ig
nored his pleas, and McMasters was still confined in Wiscasset when he
was killed by a drunken sailor in August 1815.38
The Peggy incident created political repercussions as well. Andrew
Webster was a Republican, and his detection, trial, and escape did noth
ing to improve local Federal
ists’ image of the Republican
Party. It also proved ex
Another *" Cat out of the Bag."
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George Ulmer, Hancock
County’s leading Republican.
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countermeeting ridiculed Ulmer’s attempt, pointing out that his meet
ing was attended by less than twenty men, among them several custom
house officers. Notably, Samuel Whitney, the revenue cutter captain who
had disarmed his vessel, attended the countermeeting. Clearly custom
house authorities were now drifting away from the embargo and con
forming to community standards. Ulmer grumbled to a fellow Republi
can: “There really is a want of patriotic firmness among the common
people.” Meanwhile Ulmer’s carefully constructed Republican network
began to unravel. Many formerly staunch Jeffersonians abandoned the
party because they now associated Jeffersonian politics with the em
bargo/"
In the aftermath of the Peggy incident, customs officers who did not
act within the community norms continued to be the targets of violence.
In April 1809, Deer Isle’s first selectman assaulted a customs officer. In
the words of the Lincolnville countermeeting, the officers of the federal
government had “abused that confidence we have heretofore with pride
and pleasure placed in them.” Port towns now looked to the Massachu
setts General Court to supply relief from the “oppressive” national gov
ernment.41 The legitimacy of the Republican Party and its policies nearly
self-destructed. Lucky for the party, Republican activists such as William
King were able to seize on an issue that resonated with much of Maine’s
population: squatter’s rights. With the murder of Paul Chadwick in
Malta in September 1809, the issue of squatter’s rights became all the
more compelling. The murder of Bogdomovitch and Chadwick both
reflected the tensions that were bitterly dividing Maine communities.
The embargo ended before the collective action in Penobscot Bay be
came the political action of Massachusetts as a whole. Many had pre
dicted civil war if the laws continued to be enforced. Something had to
give way, and it was the will of Thomas Jefferson that had to conform to
economic realities. A few days before leaving office, President Jefferson
signed a bill repealing the unpopular commercial restrictions. Although
the laws that followed still limited trade, they were not as devastating as
the embargo laws. Nevertheless, smuggling remained rampant under the
new nonintercourse laws until at least 1815.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from extralegal resistance
to the embargo laws. The first is that Maine’s coastal populace felt they
had a moral right to engage in maritime commerce. This conviction was
based on the resources available, their interpretation of the Constitution,
and established custom. The second conclusion is that embargo violators
were not acting as individuals. Smuggling, by definition, is a crime that
requires the acquiescence of a substantial portion of a community. Gov
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ernment attempted to prosecute smugglers as individuals, a tactic that
met with little success when society did not view smugglers as criminals.
The collective violence of embargo violators was an expression of com
munity will; they viewed the customhouse officers, not themselves, as
the transgressors. Third, the collective violence of the embargo resisters
was an expression of moral economy. While moral economy most often
espoused a negative view of commerce, it also represented a judgment
about how a market economy should serve the community. In this case,
a cessation of commerce was lethal to a community with an extractive
economy. While the embargo had a negative impact on the merchants,
the effect was far more devastating on the lower strata of society. As a re
sult, the officials who enforced a cessation of commerce became viewed
as oppressors, and targets of the community's wrath.
Finally, one should consider the scale of effort required by the federal
government to enforce the embargo laws. Every available resource was
strained to the utmost, yet the national government failed to impose its
will on the tiny communities of coastal Maine. The Jeffersonians were
slow to appreciate the strength of the commercial instinct. Once again, it
was William King who realized that power. Just as he used the squatter
issue to rescue the Republican cause, he used the issue of seaborne com
merce to argue for the separation of Maine from Massachusetts. By ma
nipulating a change in coasting laws, he persuaded coastal residents that
statehood would not harm their commercial interests. In Alan Taylors
study of agrarian resistance, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors, King ap
pears primarily as the benefactor of agrarian squatters, but it was his
courtship of Maine's coastal populace that brought statehood to Maine.4'
Seaborne commerce, the key to Maine's economy, wedded the region to
a market economy very early in its history. That adherence to commerce,
however, did not mean that coastal communities necessarily believed in
the principles of economic rationalism or abandoned communal values.

NOTES
1. Lazaro Bogdomovitch was a foreigner, probably an Italian. Why he
came to Penobscot Bay remains a mystery, but he was probably an unem
ployed sailor hired by the federal government to guard a cargo of contra
band from being retaken by smugglers.
2. Neither George Augustus Wheelers History ofCastine, Penobscot, and
Brooksville, Maine (Bangor: Burr & Robinson, 1875) nor the standard his
tory for the early settlement of Isle au Haut, George L. Hosmer's An Histori

Murder on Isle au Haut

35

cal Sketch o f the Town o f Deer Isle, Maine (Boston: Press of Stanley and
Usher, 1886), mention the murder or any of the events surrounding it.
When I presented my research to a group of Isle au Haut residents, some
members of the audience insisted that no murder had ever taken place on
the island.
3. The most reliable information about the incident comes from Federal
District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch
Depository, Waltham, Mass. This should be cross-referenced with the Han
cock County Supreme Judicial Court records and the “Hancock County
Goal Calendar, vol. 1,” all at the Maine State Archives, Augusta, Me.
4. Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Set
tlement on the Maine Frontier 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1990).
5. A typically romanticized account of the embargo may be found in
Maude Clark Gay, “The Garden of the East: Wiscasset on Sheepscot Bay,” in
The Trail o f the Maine Pioneer (Lewiston, Me.: Lewiston Journal Company,
1916), 29-49. The most recent work on the embargo’s political context is
Burton Spivak, Jefferson s English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Repub
lican Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979). For a
more controversial view, see Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties:
The Darker Side (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For maritime
history, see Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin W. Labaree,
New England and the Sea, rev. ed. (Mystic, Ct.: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc.,
1994), 76-80.
6. John Howe to George Prevost, May 5, 1808, in David W. Parker,
“Some Reports of John Howe, 1808,” American Historical Review 17
(1911-1912): 77; Paul Dudley Sargent to Thomas Jefferson, July 6, 1808, in
Carl E. Prince, ed., Microfilm Edition o f the Papers o f Albert Gallatin Papers
(Philadelphia: Historic Publications, 1970) [hereafter cited as PAG]; William
Hutchinson Rowe, The Maritime History o f Maine: Three Centuries o f Sea
faring (1948; reprint, Gardiner, Me.: Harpswell Press, 1989), 78-86; Ronald
F. Banks, Maine Becomes a State: The Movement to Separate Maine from
Massachusetts, 1785-1820 (1970; reprint, Somersworth: New Hampshire
Publishing Company, 1973), 57-58. See also Congressman Orchard Cook’s
letter to William King, William King Papers (hereafter cited as WKP) Maine
Historical Society, Portland, Me. Cook wrote “the Dis’t. of Maine has inter
ests different from the other parts of the U.S.— admit it— can you expect
that all other parts can, or ought to yield to the Dis’t. of Main[e].”
7. The staples theory of economic development was originated by the
Canadian historian Harold Innis. Carl Berger, The Writing o f Canadian His
tory: Aspects o f English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986). See also Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power
and British North America: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1941). For references to starvation, see “Embargo
Effects— In Maine,” and “Maine,” in New York Evening Post, May 9, 1808 and

36

Maine History

February 11, 1809; George Herbert to Daniel Webster, March 13, 1809, in
Charles M. Wiltse, ed., The Papers o f Daniel Webster: Correspondence
(Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1974), 1:107. Herbert
wrote of a “famine” in Hancock County and blamed the embargo.
8. “Official,” Eastern Argus [Portland, Me.], November 23, 1808, and
U.S. v. Pearl Spofford and Samuel G. Town, “Final Record Book,” Federal
District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch
Depository, Waltham, Mass.
9. Kai T. Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of
Deviance (New York: John Wiley 8c Sons, Inc., 1966), 4, 12, 21, 24; Edwin M.
Schur, The Politics o f Deviance (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1980), 24, 138. Erikson draws on Emile Durkheim’s concept of deviancy.
10. “Important Seizures Under the Embargo Law,” Gazette o f Maine
[Buckstown, Me.], June 16, 1808.
11. Seaboard merchants benefited greatly from the creation of a strong
central government under the Constitution. The federal government sup
ported aids to navigation such as lighthouses, protected shipping from pi
rates, provided courts to handle issues of interstate trade, and gave bounties
to cod fishermen. See Joyce Butler, “Rising Like a Phoenix: Commerce in
Southern Maine, 1775-1830,” in Agreeable Situations: Society, Commerce,
and Art in Southern Maine, 1780-1830, ed. Laura Fecych Sprague (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1987), 22.
12. For the problems courts had in prosecuting embargo violators, see
Dwight F. Henderson, Congress, Courts, and Criminals: The Development of
Federal Criminal Law, 1801-1829 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1985);
Douglas Lamar Jones, “‘The Caprice of Juries’: The Enforcement of the Jef
fersonian Embargo in Massachusetts,” American Journal o f Legal History 24
(1980): 319; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, November 13, 1808, PAG.
Jefferson wrote of Buckstown, “this is the first time the character of the place
has been brought under consideration as an objection. Yet a general disobe
dience to the law in any place must have weight towards refusing to give
them any facilities to evade. In such a case we may fairly require positive
proof that the individuals of a town tainted with a general spirit of disobedi
ence has never said or done anything himself to countenance that spirit.”
13. Gazette o f Maine, January 6, 1809.
14. For studies of New England merchants, see Peter Dobkin Hall, The
Organization o f American Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and
the Origins o f American Nationality (New York: New York University Press,
1982), 84, 68-75; Richard D. Brown, Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion o f In
formation in Early America, 1700-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 110-131; Allen Silver, “Friendship in Commercial Society: Eigh
teenth-Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology,” American Journal of
Sociology 95 (May 1990): 1474-1504.
15. E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular

Murder on Isle au Haut

37

Culture (New York: New Press, 1993) contains both a reprint of Thompsons
1971 article in Past and Present, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd
in the Eighteenth Century,'' and a more recent defense of his reasoning in
“The Moral Economy Reviewed." John Bohstedt, “The Moral Economy and
the Discipline of Historical Context," Journal o f Social History 26 (Winter
1992): 265-284.
16. Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the
Origins o f the American Revolution, abridged ed. (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1986), 80-87; Barbara Clark Smith, “Food Rioters and the
American Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 51 (January
1994): 3-38.
17. Ruth Bogin, “Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revo
lutionary America,” William atid Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 45 (July 1988):
391-425.
18. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random
House, 1978), 3-4.
19. Thompson, Customs in Common, 340-341, 103; Markus Rediker, Be
tween the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the
Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (New York: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1987), chap. 6 and 248-251.
20. Paul A. Gilje, “The Meaning of Freedom for Waterfront Workers,” in
Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Re
public, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),
110-111; for Jefferson's troubles in the last months of the embargo, see Levy,
Jefferson and Civil Liberties, 141.
21. For sailors, see “American Seamen,” Boston Gazette, May 19, 1808;
Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 249; for lumbermen see
Graeme Wynn, “'Deplorably Dark and Demoralized Lumberers'? Rhetoric
and Reality in Early Nineteenth-Century New Brunswick,” Journal o f Forest
History 24 (October 1980): 168-187; for fishermen, see Daniel Vickers,
Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries o f Work in Essex County, Massachu
setts 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 275
and Rowe, Maritime History o f Maine, 268.
22. Congressman Fisher Ames of Dedham, Massachusetts wrote of Adam
Smith’s Wealth o f Nations, “The principles of the book are excellent, but the
application of them to America requires caution.” See Fisher Ames to
George Richards Minot, May 29, 1789, in Works o f Fisher Ames, ed. Seth
Ames, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1854), 1:638; Ronald P. Formisano, The
Transformation o f Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 130-135, 160-164; Christine Leigh
Heyrman, Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities o f Colonial
Massachusetts, 1690-1750 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 75;
“The Spirit of the Argus,” Portland Gazette, December 12, 1808.
23. The Portland Gazette, a Federalist newspaper, published many anti-

38

Maine History

embargo letters and petitions in 1808 and 1809; for the constitutionality of
the embargo, see Jones, “The Caprice of Juries” 310, 323; Henderson, Con
gress, Courts, and Criminals, 81-84.
24. “Standing Army, and 100,000 Men!” Portland Gazette, December 12,
1808; Jones, “Caprice of Juries,” 312-315.
25. “Important Seizures, Under the Embargo Laws,” Gazette o f Maine,
June 16, 1808.
26. “Camden Town Meeting,” Portland Gazette, February 27, 1809;
“Belfast Town Meeting,” Portland Gazette, March 6, 1809; “Records of the
Town of Buckstown,” January 30, 1809, Town Clerk's Office, Bucksport, Me.
27. Albert Gallatin to Josiah Hook, June 4, 1808; Josiah Hook to Henry
Dearborn, July 21, 1808, both in PAG; Melatiah Jordan to Albert Gallatin,
June 30, 1808, “Correspondence of the Secretary of the Treasury with Col
lectors of Customs, 1789-1833,” RG 56, Ml 78, National Archives.
28. “Shipping Intelligence,” Portland Gazette, May 16, 1808; Albert Gal
latin to Robert Smith, June 4, 1808, PAG; “Extract of a letter from Belfast,”
Portland Gazette, September 5, 1808; Connecticut Courant, February 8, 1809;
Josiah Hook to Albert Gallatin, December 19, 1808, PAG.
29. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 54-55.
30. Gazette o f Maine, December 31, 1808; Luther Phillips to unknown
woman, April 5, 1884, Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, January 1, 1886.
31. “Official,” Eastern Argus, January 25, 1809, is the best account of the
Peggy Affair, and reprinted as far away as Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Balti
more, Maryland. The Republican Eastern Argus and the Federalist Portland
Gazette engaged in a lively debate as to what actually happened on Isle au
Haut for some weeks; see “Argus Falsehoods Exposed,” Portland Gazette, De
cember 5, 1808 for the accusation that the customs officials fired first. An
other source for some details is “Confirmation of the British Outrage,” Old
Colony Gazette [New Bedford], December 9, 1808. Cut shot (also known as
swan shot) was commonly used by customs officers in England; see F. F.
Nichols, Honest Thieves: The Violent Heyday o f English Smuggling (London:
Heinemann, 1973), 52.
32. See letter of Luther Philips to unknown woman, April 5, 1884, Bangor
Daily Whig and Courier, January 1, 1886. Luthers father was one of the four
who died in the smaller boat. The three others were Eben Mann, James
Douglass, and an unidentified man who was also one of the customs guards
who came from Isle au Haut with news of the murder.
33. “Hancock County Jail Calendar,” vol. 1; “Hancock County Court of
Sessions,” 2:10 for authorization of additional guards, Maine State Archives;
Josiah Hook to Albert Gallatin, December 19, 1808, PAG; William Pillsbury
to Commanders of the U.S. ship Chesapeake, ship Wasp, or brig Argus, No
vember 15, 1808, “Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers,
1798-1868;” RG 45, M 149, National Archives. For an account of the United
States Navy's role in enforcing the embargo, see Joshua M. Smith, “lSo Far

M urder on Isle au H au l

39

Distant from the Eye of A uthority:'The Embargo o f 1807 and the U S. Navy,
1807-1809,” in New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the
Twelfth Naval History Symposium , ed. William B. Cogar (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1997), 123-140.
34. Jail accounts, May 1809 term, Hancock County Court o f Sessions, in
“Hancock County Court of Sessions Records,” Maine State Archives; “M ur
derers Rescued!” Eastern Argus, December 29, 1808; Philadelphia Daily Ad
vertiser, Decem ber 30, 1808.
35. Wheeler, History of Castine, 7 8 - 7 9 ; this is the only matter connected
with the m urder of Bogdom ovitch m entioned in this book. See also
“Maine,” New York Evening Post, February 11, 1809; Com m onwealth v. Ed
ward Lewis and Others, Hancock C ounty Supreme Judicial Court records
June 1809 term, Maine State Archives. See also accounts o f John M inot, Castine’s goal keeper, May 8, 1809, in H ancock C ou nty C ourt o f Sessions
records, Maine State Archives.
36. Eastern Argus, January 26, 1809.
37. Webster served as a deputy sheriff and court crier for H ancock
Count)'; see George Ulmer's account, May 1808 term, H ancock County
Court of Com m on Pleas, Maine State Archives; for his escape, see deposi
tion of Ephraim Mullet, May 21, 1810, in LLS. v. George L4mer file papers,
and LIS. v. Andrew Webster, “Final Record Book,” March 1809 term , Federal
District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch
Depositors Waltham, Mass. For Webster's life in Nova Scotia see Charles
Bruce Fergusson, The Diary of Simeon Perkins, I7L)7—1S03 (Toronto: C ham 
plain Societv, 1967), 4:403n.
38. For smuggling during the embargo, see U.S. v. John M cMasters, “Fi
nal Record Book,” September 1809 term, Federal District Court Records,
Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, W altham,
Mass.; for Me Master's pleas from jail, see Journal o f the House o f Representa
tives of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1826), 8:32, 686, and
691; tor McMaster's death see Rufus K. Sewall, Wiseasset Point: The Old
Meeting House and Interesting Incidents Connected with its History (W iscasset, Me.: Charles E. Emerson, 1883), 11-14.
39. LHmer to Caleb Strong, Septem ber 26, 1812, “Secretary o f the Com monwealth/Commissions,” Massachusetts State Archives, Boston.
40. “Hancock Countv M eeting,” Eastern Argus, Januarv 19, 1809; “At a le
gal meeting of the inhabitants o f Lin col mull e,” Montreal Gazette , March 20,
1809; LTlmer to W illiam King, March 17, 1809, WTKP; “Another LCat out of
the Bag,’” Gazette o f Maine, March 25, 1809.
41. LLS. v. Pearl Spofford and Samuel G. Town, “Final Record Book,"
March 1810 term, Federal D istrict Court Records, Maine District, RG 21,
National Archives Branch Depositor)', W altham, Mass.; “At a legal meeting
of the inhabitants o f Lincolnville,” Montreal Gazette, March 20, 1809.
42. Banks, Maine Becomes a State, 126—129.

